Antonio Fiori - 12/ 2011

If in the last thirty years the position of the United States in regard to China has oscillated between containment and engagement, in the past few weeks the relationship between the two superpowers has taken the shape of a fully-fledged head-to-head confrontation. This shift, also determined by the American failure to include China within an international system led by the United States, has been triggered off by a series of initiatives carried forward by President Barack Obama during his recent nine-day “tour” of the Pacific. The first stop of this trip was the APEC Summit (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), in mid-November, actually organised by the Americans in Honolulu. During the Summit, Obama urged China to comply with the international economic rules and to take on a position of greater responsibility and maturity inside the international community. On the margins of the Summit, the leaders of nine countries (Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaya, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, Vietnam) met in order to discuss the implementation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious regional free-trade programme which Japan, Canada and Mexico are also strongly interested in joining. Access to the TPP is not precluded to China aprioristically; however, the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, has said that programme membership is bound by the upholding of some fundamental values, such as a sincere reciprocity and non-discrimination between Member Countries. Notwithstanding the slogans, for China this would mean the abandonment of currency manipulation, the waiver of subsidies granted to the State companies and a more rigorous protection of intellectual property rights. The need to satisfy such conditions seems to make it hard for China – the second world economic power – to foster an interest in putting forward its own candidature for the TPP. If the economic component of the TPP is definitely very important – offering Washington the chance to intervene in the future economic order of the Pacific – the strategic one is probably much more so, seeing that this treaty offers China’s neighbours an alternative to their excessive dependence on Beijing. Right after the APEC Summit Obama went to Australia, a country that is allied to the United States on the political and military levels. There, in his keynote speech before the Australian Parliament, Obama announced that his country should to all extents and purposes be considered a Pacific power, making clear the shift of the United States axis vis-à-vis Asia. After a decade of war in the Middle East, the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize winner explained, the time had come for the United States to turn its attention to the vast potential offered by the region of Pacific Asia, contributing to the future definition of their own region. By way of confirmation of this, Obama announced that by 2016 two thousand five hundred United States marines would be stationed in Darwin, the chief town and major centre of the Northern Territory. In view of the fact that Darwin is situated just 960 kilometres further south than the South China Sea, that move could be seen as the desire on the part of the United States not to be caught unprepared for any occurrence in the territory or, to put it bluntly, as a form of deterrence vis-à-vis the growing Chinese fleet. The high point of Obama’s Asian tour was touched on the occasion of the Eastern Asia Summit (EAS) which took place in Bali, in Indonesia. In this scenario the United States President tabled the question of the South China Sea, even though the Chinese had advised the Americans not to “intervene” in matters relating to such a sensitive area as this. Indeed, China’s official position is that the territorial disputes relating to the South China Sea must be managed by means of bilateral talks between the affected countries, and in no way should third party countries or other international organisations get or be involved. This position was peremptorily stressed by the Prime Minister Wen Jiabao who, upon arriving in Bali, declared that the conflicts relating to sovereignty should be resolved by means of peaceful consultations and talks between sovereign States, with no interference whatsoever on the part of countries external to the region. The behaviour of the United States in the above-described circumstances and their much-publicised “return to Asia” leads us to suppose that a position of containment on the part of Washington to the detriment of China is taking shape, even though Obama and his advisors have officially denied it. This could also be a direct consequence of the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s firm rejection in 2009 of Obama’s proposal to reach a geopolitical convergence between the United States and China, a sort of “group of two.” In fact, straight after the failure of this attempt, Washington strategically readjusted its Chinese policy; such a repositioning is also visible in a series of decisions of a military nature made by Washington, such as its closer ties with Japan and South Korea, the consolidation of the military bases geographically close to China, and the support offered to the countries that have territorial disputes with Beijing over the South China Sea or in other geographical areas. Highly significant in this overall picture has also been the announcement of the United States opening to Myanmar, consecrated by Clinton’s subsequent visit to Naypyidaw. The long task carried out in the shadow of United States diplomacy to force the Burma regime to provide an opening seems to be coming to fruition; time will tell if the road undertaken was the right one but from Washington’s point of view, reducing Myanmar’s reliance on China is already a great result. Moreover, it is no secret that probably behind the decision of the Burma regime to suspend the construction of a dam at Myitsone in cooperation with the Chinese is indeed Washington’s promise to block the sanctions. It is no secret either that Beijing has reacted very badly to this news Before the reiterated United States “provocations,” the Chinese have, however, held a substantially mild and balanced stance, abstaining from any strong reaction. This has surprised a number of commentators, in particular in the West. During the APEC, for instance, the President Hu Jintao just invited Obama to respect the legitimate Chinese interests in Asia and the Pacific, adding that China would welcome a purposeful role of the United States in the region favourably. The spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Minister, for instance, answering a question addressed to him in regard to the United States intention to station troops in Australia replied very diplomatically that this “might not be appropriate.” And even when China found itself dealing with the annoyance of Vietnam and the Philippines, encouraged directly or indirectly by Washington, the Chinese leaders showed a certain understanding. The Chinese assent could have been triggered off by the delicate domestic situation, given the preparations for the imminent change in leadership: next year’s 18th National Congress – the official scenario for the Party’s internal renewal – is considered to be an absolute priority. In such a crucial moment, Beijing certainly does not want that power transition to be in some way threatened by external factors of any kind. Hence, keeping calm and keeping a very low profile before the external threats is necessary for Beijing to foster internal political stability. There is no doubt, then, that Beijing can decide to react to the United States offensive in the Pacific by moving in several areas: first of all, by reassuring the members of the ASEAN that it has no hegemonic ambition not wish to interfere in the sovereignty of others; in the second place, “blackmailing” its neighbours – especially those who are looking with interest at the South China Sea – by means of the economic lever; and lastly, by starting – through the press – to pass on the message according to which the most recent military equipment, above all of a navy type, could turn their attention towards those countries that might use the shield of the United States to stretch their arms over the South China Sea. Of course, a lot will also depend on the American administration’s capacity to earn the blind trust of the countries inserted in the theatre of the Pacific and the latter’s intention to break off relations with Beijing. In any case, as shown by the talks that the Chinese leaders have had with Obama both in Hawaii and in Indonesia, it seems as though Washington and Beijing prefer to search for a win-win kind of solution, one that displeases no one. The future of relations between the superpower by antonomasia and the rising giant could therefore be determined by the concessions that both of them are willing to make, as well as in the ability that they will both show in having been able to influence the other stakeholders in the Pacific area.

Antonio Fiori
(University of Bologna)