Alfonso Botti - 11/ 2011

Mariano Rajoy’s Popular Party (Pp) won the election on 20th November, gaining an absolute majority in the Congress with 186 constituencies or 44.62% of the vote. The socialists under Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba were duly trounced: they won no more than 110 seats and a percentage of 28.73%. Ignoring the Senate (which plays a secondary role in Spain’s parliamentary system – though, be it noted, the Pp passed from 101 to 136 seats, the socialists slumped from 89 to 48), this is the high point for the Populars in the whole history of Spanish democracy, in terms of votes, percentages and constituencies; it exceeds even José María Aznar’s performance in the 2000 general election. For the socialists it was an all-time low – votes, percentage and constituencies. Compared with the last general election the Pp grew by about 5 points and added 32 seats; the Psoe lost over 15% of votes and 59 seats. In all, that is some 3.3 million electors whose vote went to Izquierda Unida (almost doubling their performance from 3.77% in 2008 to 6.92% and from 2 to 11 constituencies), and to Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD) (who have gone from one seat and 1.19% in 2008 to 5 seats and 4.69% of the vote this time). Even assuming the increased absenteeism (2.16% up on 2008) was socialist disappointees, there still remains a non-negligible vote that swung directly over from the socialists to the popular party. These are the key data, but one more fact should be properly weighed, given its political implications for the future. The Basque vote has not only swung over to the nationalist parties but, for the first time since Franco died, has backed the radical core (the Amaiur line-up) which pooled more votes (and constituencies) than the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the traditional voice of moderate democratic Basque nationalism. The Pp victory was a foregone conclusion. The writing was on the wall as far back as the June 2009 European elections when the Popular Party overhauled the socialists. Confirmation of the trend came with a bang on 22nd May 2011 when the Psoe lost all the Autonomous Communities where it was in power, as well as the main cities including the traditional strongholds of Seville, Cordova and Barcelona. This 20th November vote presents a broadly even picture of massive popular gains mirrored by a socialist collapse, the causes of which are easily listed. Rodríguez Zapatero had sailed smartly round the turn at the first legislature when he was confirmed by the people in March 2008; he also impressed public opinion abroad with his reforms to extend civil rights. But he proved woefully inadequate when the international economic crisis broke. First he underestimated and denied it, wasting precious time; then in May 2010 he did a sudden U-turn with European institutions breathing down his neck, but his draconian measures were off-target with salaried-worker incomes and ineffectual in generating employment. Meanwhile unemployment figures topped 20% (40% among the young), an avalanche of families reneged on their mortgage payments, the economy entered recession and forecasts for the immediate future of the GDP remained dire. Zapatero may, of course, have assumed it was a passing storm, counted on light at the end of the tunnel just when elections came up in 2012, and hence pursued tranquillizer tactics while the house burned around his ears. With reality staring him in the face Zapatero belatedly realised his blunder. To stem the electoral haemorrhage, on 2nd April he announced he would not be running for a third term come 2012. When the May administrative elections were a flop he held out against pressing by Rajoy to anticipate the ballot date of March 2012. Then, in late July he gave in, announced an early election and let it be known he would personally not even be standing for parliament. He ducked an impromptu Conference as well as the stepping-stone of primaries. After internal squabbling the choice of the new candidate fell on Pérez Rubalcaba, a political veteran versed in party mechanisms and State ganglia, appreciated as Home Minister for his firmness with ETA. The real loser was Carmen Chacón who was pressurised by the party machinery into forgoing primaries she might well have won. The end of Zapaterism (and its namesake) can hardly be put down to bad communications or pep-talk tactics painting reality pink when storm clouds were brewing. Zapatero personalised and centralised his politics, giving little say to his governing team. Though the party backed him up, it failed to bring him closer to realism. In that sense it may not all be his own fault: the whole party is up for review and so is the quality of their in-house debate. The new phase that is just starting for the 220,000 card-carrying party members will work towards a Conference at Seville in the first week of February which should produce a new secretary general and candidate for the 2015 contest. Names are purely conjectural; it is not certain whether Pérez Rubalcaba will stand again, or whether Chacón will enter the fray. On the other front all eyes are now trained on Mariano Rajoy whose limitations were well-known even before he had a chance to show qualities (other than balance and tenacity, which are not to be sniffed at). Picked by Aznar on the eve of the 2004 elections, Rajoy bungled his first election, though less through his own fault than by Aznar’s handling of the Atocha station bomb attacks on March 11th. Later years saw Rajoy in thrall to the party hawks and their heavy-handed campaign to question the socialist victory and the government it produced. A short-sighted attitude for which they paid by defeat in 2008, though the Pp percentage, votes and constituency figures were creeping back up. The worst moment in Rajoy’s career came just after that ballot when the Aznarite old guard laid into him, especially Esperanza Aguirre, president of the Autonomous Community of Madrid. He came through with flying colours, kept control of the party and trounced his internal enemies at the Valencia Conference in June 2008. Step by step from that date on, Rajoy has consolidated his lead, raised a new generation of executives including many women (María Dolores de Cospedal and Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría), stayed clear of scandals that involved top Pp personalities (the “Güertel affair” above all), and slowly climbed the popularity ratings where Zapatero used to dominate him, especially at those debates on the state of the Nation held each year at the Cortes. Rajoy is no charismatic leader; he is not flashy and has little oratory. But he has stayed the course and amassed administrative experience in his native Galicia as well as learning ministerial ropes in two Aznar legislatures. When he is invested at the Monocloa – presumably around December 20th - and has assembled his team, he will find he has precious little room for manoeuvre in terms of economic policy. Reducing the public deficit, structural reforms particularly on labour market flexibility: such will be his testing ground. He will have to create new jobs, reform the financial system and winkle out the submerged economy. During his election campaign he promised he would safeguard the purchasing power of pensions, which the socialist government was forced to freeze. No easy task awaits him.

Alfonso Botti
(University of Modena & Reggio Emilia)