Giulia Guazzaloca - 11/ 2011

On 27 October, after a meeting that lasted over ten hours, the Eurozone's leaders decided on an anti-crisis plan aimed at revising and reinforcing Europe's economic governance and averting the collapse of the single currency. Hailed by the president of the European Parliament, Jery Buzek, as an «historical moment for the European Union», the agreement is based on three main points: the recapitalisation of 90 banks that are to be subjected to stress-tests (106 billion euros will be allocated by June 2012), greater resources for the European Financial Stability Facility, whose fund has been raised to 1,000 billion euros, and a range of measures which will allow Greece to lower its public debt from its current rate of 160% to 120% by 2020. Italy's plans to tackle the crisis, requested by the European Council on 23 October, have also been closely examined, and approved with caution. The European Commission will have to oversee the application of the measures to be adopted by the Italian government. Complex, ambitious, but also incomplete and full of uncertainties as it is, this agreement is without question the widest-ranging and best structured plan set out by the Eurozone's heads of state and government since the Greek crisis started at the end of 2009. The markets responded well, with the European stock markets rising sharply the following day, and the leaders in Brussels and the leaders of the 27 member states appear to be satisfied. But the general approval for the agreement, which according to the Barroso Commission shows an awareness of the importance of economic governance at community level in rediscovering competitiveness and cohesion, cannot banish the uncertainties, frictions and mistakes which have emerged over the past few months. It is not only a question of the usual rhetoric of “too late, too little” or the (correct) observation that the measures agreed upon on 27 October mark a step forward, but certainly not a “final solution”; it is rather a question of acknowledging the political and institutional crisis which has overtaken Europe, affecting the very legitimacy of the community project inaugurated over half a century ago. Yet another annus horribilis is drawing to a close for the EU, especially for the countries of the Eurozone, but Europe's weakness cannot be linked to unfavourable but more or less foreseeable circumstances alone. All analysts have noted for instance that when faced with the double challenge of saving the euro and the war in Libya, the European Union was once again in disarray, divided, lacking courage and the will to act. But many have also noted that, emergencies aside, Europe is afflicted by a deeper and more long-term crisis: a crisis of political vision, the level of consensus among the citizens of Europe, the capacity for coordination of the various states and community institutions, the genuine will to overcome national egoism and bilateral agreements (useful perhaps temporarily, but not capable of producing genuine political integration). None of this came out during the course of the year, when financial matters, revolution in North Africa and the war in Libya have highlighted the lack of both leadership and the institutional mechanisms to give form and substance to a shared political project and a genuine participatory democracy at European level. The agreement reached on 27 October was brokered primarily by the European bankers and the Merkel-Sarkozy duo, whereas the war in Libya was dominated by the Anglo-French axis. None of the institutions in Brussels stood out in terms of visibility and activism, except for the ECB, which has played a key role on the European stage during the course of this year, but without wielding any real political power: little has been seen of the Barroso Commission, the Council president Herman van Rompuy and above all the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The vacuum is all the more serious and dangerous because of a growing “renationalisation”. Both East and West there is a sprouting up of populist and neo-nationalist, when not overtly xenophobic, movements, and national governments, caught as they are between the diktats of the banks and the rating agencies and the desperate need to win consensus among their citizens, are looking weak and discredited. The eminent sociologist Jürgen Habermas raised these problems in a recent essay denouncing the democratic deficit in European governance and advocating greater “political integration based on social prosperity”. But if Greece's debts and the crisis of the euro have brought to light the need to increase the EU's political responsibilities (or those of the Eurozone), so as to protect it against financial speculation and pave the way for structural reform at fiscal level, there is an even greater need to reinforce community cooperation on foreign policy. All agree that Europe (the EU in particular, but also the individual countries) did not give a good account of itself during the “Arab Spring”, which swept through Tunisia, Egypt and Libya at the beginning of the year. The southern shore of the Mediterranean may be an important security belt for the countries of Europe and an area of intense cultural, economic and commercial ties, but the North African revolutions and the civil war in Libya have had the effect of making immigration the focus of controversy and fear once more, without dispelling Europe's inability to promote a common foreign policy. Alongside Germany's disengagement from the NATO operation in Libya, there has been the hyper-activity of the French president Sarkozy, comfortable as always in the robes of the leader of “international emergencies”, Italy's ineffectiveness, despite having played an important role in that country, and the low profile kept by Europe's leaders, Barroso, van Rompuy and Ashton. On 20 October, after 41 years and 8 months of violent warfare, Muammar Gaddafi was killed by the rebels; but Libya's future still hangs in the balance and is no less uncertain than the war which has just ended. It would seem perfectly logical that the European Union should have a lead role in this process of managing the humanitarian crisis and the reconstruction, containing Islamic fundamentalism, controlling the divisions between clans and the various militias, setting the country on the path towards democratisation, stopping Tripoli turning into another Baghdad. But it is not a foregone conclusion. The divisions, the hesitancy, the mistakes made during the war, are cause for uncertainty among the observers regarding the possibility that the EU can act as a protagonist in handling the complexities of reconstruction in Libya. Satisfaction for the result obtained at the summit on 27 October has therefore been diminished by the awareness that there is still a long way to go on the path to a political and economic integration beyond the intergovernmental dimension and the dimension of “bilateral Europe”. Two years ago, in an article in the Corriere della Sera, on the eve of the European elections, Claudio Magris wrote that “if there is not yet enough Europe, it is a tragedy, or at least a phase of stalemate which must be overcome”. But it is since 2005 that all talk of Europe has been about “stalemate”, “impasse”, the need for “new start”. It remains to be seen whether the anti-crisis measures set out in Brussels last week will suffice to reboot the economy in the Eurozone. To be sure, they will not suffice to revive the political will which, at the time of the founding fathers, had identified “European unity” as the sole guarantee for a free, prosperous and secure Europe.

Giulia Guazzaloca
(University of Bologna)