Francesco Benvenuti - 10/ 2011

At the United Russia congress on 24 September, Medvedev and Putin finally revealed who would be running in the presidential elections on March 2012: Putin. It was Medvedev himself who announced his candidature, while making himself available as head of government. The question that has been puzzling public opinion internally and internationally for exactly two years, in other words since Putin said that a joint decision would be taken when the time was right, has now been answered. Shortly beforehand, Medvedev published an article on his blog under the title “Forward Russia!” that had the look of an original programme ahead of the presidential election. It advocates the country's “modernisation” not only at an economic and cultural level but also at the political level. He then goes on to say that he would not be ruling out the possibility of running for a second term in office. Medvedev's work and statements throughout his mandate (since March 2008) only partly reflect the expectations of those in Russia and the West who see in him the embodiment of a liberal and liberist alternative to the politics of Putin. However, they did create high expectations for the future, both in the more open-minded sections of Russia's public opinion and among international governments. In his role as president, Medvedev has said that he doesn't rule out the possibility of remission for Khodorkovsky. Also, that he would oversee the easing of bureaucratic strictures for NGOs operating within the Federation; guarantee access to the Duma to groupings who do not meet the strict admission criteria; campaign to reduce sentences for economic crimes; assert the incompatibility of government office with the management of economic companies; seek an agreement with Obama on the new bilateral nuclear treaty (START III); join with the UN in imposing sanctions on Iran; abstain from voting on the humanitarian military operation in Libya. President Medvedev even protested against the overbearing role played by United Russia (whose president is Putin) in politics. Lastly, as a mark of his will to stamp his authority on the party, in September 2010 he removed from office the sempiternal Ju. Luzhkov, 18 years the mayor of Moscow, despite resistance from the citizen organisation of United Russia. Naturally, there have been pronouncements of a different nature too, such as the colossal gaffe of not congratulating Obama on his election, and instead presenting him with a list of demands for Russian security. As for the war with Georgia in August 2008, despite everything, it was quickly condoned by the European Commission and the Obama administration, and did not damage the positive internal and international political view of Medvedev. On the contrary, in recent months, Germany and the United States have suggested to the Russian establishment that it would be beneficial for Medvedev to run for a second mandate in the presidential elections in March 2012. The president's international rating has grown since the Spring, when he led his country to adopt a positive neutral stance in the UN Security Council vote on the international military operation in Libya. Putin opposed him vigorously, but Medvedev stood firm. During the course of his presidency, Medvedev has replaced (on the basis of a law promulgated by Putin in 2005) practically half of the governors of the political-territorial units that make up the Russian Federation, as well as dozens of officials at all levels in the Ministries of Defence and Home Affairs. The reasons for the changes remain obscure, but it may be surmised that they were directed, partly at least, at combating corruption, embezzlement, private interests in public affairs and other phenomena likely to compromise the reputation of the state in the eyes of its citizens, such as the lack of transparency surrounding lucrative industrial contracts for the modernisation of Russia's armed forces, not to mention the many actions by the police which damage the rights of the citizens. However, the doubt remains that his organisational activism has been linked to the general election next December and the aim of corroborating the declining popularity of United Russia, which is the mainstay (with the duumviri) of the current establishment. For over a year and a half, the question of who would run in the upcoming elections has mesmerised Russian public opinion and international observers alike. At the end of August 2011, there were the first signs that a solution was close to being found. Medvedev removed from his circle of advisers the analyst G. Pavlovsky, after the latter had intensified his campaign to make him advance his candidacy with or without Putin. Had Medvedev lost the contest with his mentor – Pavlovsky argued – he could have established a stable and, in all likelihood, a not too marginal point of reference for the forces of Russian democracy and liberism. Another premonitory sign came in September. The businessman M. Prorokhov, prompted by the president's administration (read V. Surkov) to lead the liberal party (Right Cause, which was excluded from the last two elections in the Duma owing to a poor election result), was “rejected” by the party congress. It has been suggested that, under Prorokhov, Right Cause may have become the parliamentary base for a re-elected Medvedev. But the operation failed, also as a result of the inexperience of Prorokhov, who chose a number of “freaks” to lead his election list who outraged Medvedev and consequently brought the entire project to ruin. On 26 September, another high-profile figure was sacrificed. The finance minister, A.Kudrin, who is respected also abroad for his contribution to strengthening the Russian budget, was fired by Medvedev for opposing his economic policy of high military and social spending and expressing his intention not to enter a future government headed by Medvedev. It is possible that Kudrin's chagrin is the result also of the “castling” move which has cut him out of the running for the prime minister's office at the next elections. Clearly, the “castling” has rocked the country's political stability, which the citizens of Russia had become accustomed to with two mandates of Putin. The opposition parties have openly stated that this chess-like move was predictable. Evidently, they think that at the general election in December they will benefit from the picture of immobility the “castling” move suggests. Opposition analysts have also adopted the “the worse the better” line: it was wishful thinking to suppose that Medvedev was an alternative to Putin, and the “castling” proves just how unfounded such expectations were. A Russian Arab Spring cannot be ruled out. Pavlosky, the current president's rejected bedfellow, has argued more soberly: with Medvedev's withdrawal from the presidential race, a genuine political pluralism has been sacrificed in favour of an alchemy which represents the stability the duumviri most deeply fear. Nezavisimaya Gazeta has expressed its disappointment. In an interview with an evasive Medvedev who was giving nothing away whatsoever, the journalist came very close to accusing him of cowardice. It is difficult to say whether the “castling” will guarantee a peaceful transition or lead to further complications.

Francesco Benvenuti
(University of Bologna)