International Focus
Azzurra Meringolo - 09/ 2011
Non only Libya. The cases of Sudan and South Sudan

focus
 
The birth of the 54th African state was officially announced on 9 July. The event was marked by a great celebration in Juba, the capital of the new republic where for many citizens a dream has come true. The city was decked out for the celebrations and plastered with pictures of the new president, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and John Garang, the man who is perceived as the father of the nation and who died in an aircrash in 2005, shortly after the signing of the peace agreement which brought to a close a crippling war with the North of the country. The 2005 agreement marked the beginning of a six-year transitional period at the end of which both sides promised a referendum promoting national unity as the most desirable formula. As it turned out, neither side actually pushed for unity, and the result of the referendum held on 9 January led to Southern Sudan becoming in every respect the newest arrival in the current panorama of relations. The celebrations and the euphoria in South Sudan continued for days, and, as well as the end of a struggle for independence, 9 July will come to mark the start of a new era not only for North and South Sudan, but also for the strip of territory that lies between them, south Khordofan. All these regions are facing thorny questions both internally and in their relations with their neighbours. Their future would appear far from certain. With the end of the celebrations, the task of building the new state of South Sudan must begin practically from scratch. With over nine million people belonging to different ethnic groups of Nilotic origins – both Christian and animist – the government in Juba must create a political class capable of ruling and, what with only fifty kilometres of sealed roads, a great deal of infrastructure too. Furthermore, in order to avoid conflicts among the tribes as they manoeuvre for power, it is vital that a strong sense of national unity be fostered in order also to present a unified front to North Sudan, which has every interest in perpetuating a state of instability in the South. South Sudan's rich deposits of zinc, copper and oil have hitherto benefited only the North, which, while lacking deposits of its own, has the refineries. South Sudan currently uses a pipeline belonging to the North and is forced to share with it the profits from the black gold, which represent 98% of its GDP. A new pipeline passing through Kenya would be conceivable, but the companies that would be interested in such a project are reluctant to become involved in such an unstable region. Japan has been looking with interest at the possibility of building a canal through the Malay Peninsula, but political stability is required, and that is precisely what the North seeks to undermine. The North, on the other hand, is under pressure not only because of the loss of a sizeable chunk of mineral-rich territory, but also as a result of internal instability and the criticism of the international community. Whereas the Arab League is criticising North Sudan for having allowed the South to slip out of its grasp, thereby reducing the organisation's influence in the region, many countries and human rights organisations continue to criticise the government in Khartoum. In addition, the “scent of the Arab Spring” has reached the borders of Sudan, energising those who oppose the Islamic regime established in 1989 and currently under the leadership of Omar Hassan al Bashir. The country is predominantly Muslim, but the president's growing unpopularity has led the various tribes to rebel against the central government. Following the secession, opponents of Bashir's party demanded a new government, a demand that was at first rejected by the president but was latterly reconsidered by the party secretary, who said that certain members of the party are ready to face early elections to review the results of the last round of elections, considered by many to be fraudulent. In recent months, the situation has become particularly urgent in south Khordofan, the strip of land that lies between North and South Sudan. Inhabited predominantly by Nilotic peoples, like its neighbour to the south, the region was meant to decide whether to join with the government in Juba with a referendum in the Spring which was never held. To compensate, administrative elections were held in which the party that rules in Khartoum won. The newly appointed governor was Ahmed Haroun, who, alongside Al-Bashir, is on the list of people wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague in connection with crimes against humanity in Darfur. Furthermore, the highlands to the East of the region are home to the Nuba, a people which has long supported the struggle for independence of South Sudan and lives in a region which is particularly rich in mineral deposits. Since 6 June, the inhabitants of this area have been subjected to military action by the North. Khordofan is rebelling against Khartoum, whose anachronistic mode of response is the iron fist. Under a blanket of media silence, the Nuba Mountains daily see executions and targeted bombing. The escalation of violence has led numerous NGOs to speak of the ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Nuba people. On 28 June, the UN Security Council responded by sending four thousand Ethiopian blue berets on a six-month mission to the district of Abey in South Khordofan. Following 9 July, Khartoum, which wanted the mission to be conducted exclusively by Ethiopian troops under the leadership of the African Union, rejected the peacekeepers and the agreement to demilitarise the area signed by the governments of North and South Sudan appears to have evaporated completely. The agreement was intended to manage the transition period in which the borders of the two countries were to be defined. The seriousness of the situation was highlighted on 23 July by the death of the leader of the South Sudanese rebels, Gatluak Gai, who was killed one week after accepting a ceasefire agreement. The army states that the rebel leader was killed by his own men, whereas the rebels say he was 'assassinated' by the regular South Sudanese army. The picture would not be complete without recalling the ongoing situation in neighbouring Darfur, where the population is of similar origins to those of South Sudan and southern Khordofan, and where, in 2003, bloody conflict ensued between the sedentary autochtonous tribes and the nomadic Arab tribes for control of the resources. The government of North Sudan has been trying to aggravate internal divisions for some time, to the point of sending in its militias to terrorise and kill the population, with a view to neutralising any separatist tendencies on the part of the black majority in Darfur. The hopes of those in South Sudan who have embarked on the long-awaited path of independence are therefore mixed with despair at the current state of the political situation. Although the new country has declared its intention of establishing good relations with Khartoum, there remain many unresolved questions which could lead to friction. One such question is citizenship. The South has said it will grant citizenship to people from the North, but President Bashir does not seem willing to grant the same rights to the South Sudanese residing in the area around Khartoum. Sudan's tribal structure makes the internal situation in each region more complicated, and the war in Khordofan exacerbates the tensions and undermines stability. This partly inhibits the capacity of the new state to make progress in building its institutions, a process which promises to be long and difficult, but one which it is hoped will result in genuine progress for the new state and in the resolution of regional disputes.

Azzurra Meringolo
(Dipartimento di Studi Internazionali,Università di Roma Tre)