Emiliano Alessandri - 28/05/2012

     The NATO summit in Chicago had no particular ambition except to consolidate the consensus reached in Lisbon two years ago when a new “strategic concept” was drawn up for the Alliance. To that extent the result was achieved. The allies noted the progress made towards a common missile defence system which Lisbon prioritised as the new “core mission”. The NATO countries also resisted talk of returning to an Alliance centring exclusively on territorial defence – its original raison d’être – under the pressure of budgetary tightness which is common to both shores of the Atlantic. What was stressed, though with varying degrees of emphasis, was the idea that twenty-first century threats call for a NATO that can operate “out of area”, as shown by the commitment in Afghanistan as well as in the clamp-down on piracy off the Somali coast.

     Lastly, the NATO leaders once more insisted on the strategic importance (and economic value) of the various partnerships the Alliance has made increasing use of in recent years – a policy extending to how military operations are conducted. People tend to forget that the Afghan mission draws on fifty countries, and that regional partners like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates contributed military resources during the recent operation in Libya. However, the success of the summit in restating this overall policy line by no means disposes of certain areas of doubt that continue to hang over the future of the Alliance. The issue is not, as some think, whether NATO has a future. Its ability to adapt, as it has since the Cold War ended, provides proof of moving with the times.

     The actual crux is whether the allies can get their act together enough to offer NATO something more than mere survival. One thorny problem tackled at Chicago was resources: they have shrunk both in the United States and in a Europe feeling the nip of crisis. The winning solution would seem to be “intelligent defence”, which boils down to rationalising: avoiding waste and redundancy. In the best hypothesis, such a reform will lead to greater military integration. On the European scene the only way to avoid losing defence capacity is for countries to specialise more and gradually pool resources and armament systems. But it is pointless to expect there will be linear development towards such a goal. Even amid today’s crisis, the NATO countries still jealously guard their own prerogatives and are reluctant to do any drastic pruning of military bureaucracy.

     Again, budgetary considerations will continue to depend not only on the state of the various economies but also on the ideological approach to security, which continues to differ. Despite the patent instability surrounding the southern shore of the Mediterranean and the post-Soviet area, Europeans by and large seem less worried than the Americans about direct threats to their own safety, and are hence less inclined to invest in defence. The extreme instance of this is still Germany: since her defeat in World War II she seems not to have got round to the idea that economic performance calls for matching military strength. The Americans are now pressing for something which used to be total anathema: that Berlin should revert to being a power.

     For the moment the response is a guarded one. Much as with the future of European governance, the risk seems to be of hesitant, not overbearing, German leadership. Chicago also felt something of the shadow of Afghanistan. The chances of success there have dwindled with time. The long-agreed decision to transfer responsibility for defence to the Afghani army in 2014 will be adhered to, but how far this will ensure real stability in the field remains to be seen. At all events, the mission has highlighted the limits of trans-Atlantic cooperation. The European governments seem never to have fully persuaded themselves or their peoples of the need for military commitment.

     The new French president’s unilateral decision to pull out as of this year here seems emblematic: Europe’s role has become residual where for the last decade it had been marginal, at least as far as strategy decisions were concerned. Until only a year or so ago it was said that NATO’s future was being staked on Afghanistan. Even more clearly than then, we now see it was a mistake to view the issue in such terms. NATO will survive this and other challenges. But if we don’t see eye to eye on defining strategy priorities for the new century, the term ‘mere survival’ is bound to spring to mind.

Emiliano Alessandri
(Senior Transatlantic Fellow al German Marshall Fund, Washington)