Umberto Marengo - 05/04/2012

     Traditionally the countries of Scandinavia have always tended to be suspicious of European fiscal and monetary union, although their economies are geared to high value-added exports and hence benefit undeniably from the common market. Denmark and Sweden voted against introducing the Euro in 2000 and 2003 yet their own central banks have long been aligned with the European Central Bank. Norway has shelved the question of joining the EU ever since the negative referendum in 1994, but remains in the European Economic Area and is thus subject to community legislation on the unified market. So what is the root of Scandinavian Euroscepticism? 
    
     In March the agency YouGov conducted a survey on behalf of Cambridge University concerning the Euro crisis as perceived in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and other European countries; the cross-section of public opinion it reveals is one of the most Eurosceptical in Europe, on a par with Great Britain alone. In principle one third of the Danes and Swedes are in favour of greater European integration; another third are alarmed at the growing areas of Brussels jurisdiction. A significant 15% in either country would like to back out of the European Union. 

     Straining somewhat to probe attitudes on longer-term policy, the poll suggests that more than half the Danes and the Swedes would be against having a European Union President directly elected by the people as in the United States, while only 22% of Swedes and 19% of Danes would be amenable. Though the issue is hardly on any agenda, the finding does become interesting if one compares it with the three biggest continental European countries: over 45% of the French and Germans and 61% of Italians would welcome direct election, while only a quarter of the French and Germans and a mere 15% of Italians came out against the idea. 

     Scandinavian reactions to possible forms of fiscal federation are even crisper. One issue might be the setting up of a European “ministry of the Treasury” empowered to apply common rules to national budgets. Over 65% of Scandinavians are clean contrary to this, whereas the Ayes prevail in France (38% in favour, 31% against) and Germany (35% in favour, 32% against). Italy is again notable for its lack of confidence in national administrations: an incredible (and probably unrealistic) 63% favoured European powers of intervention. The risk of losing sovereignty is felt politically and diplomatically, not just economically: a mere 15% of Scandinavians would be in favour of one European place on the UN Security Council; the percentage rises elsewhere, but only to one third of the people in France and Germany and 50% in Italy. It is on the economic wicket that continental Europe and its perceptions differ most markedly from Scandinavia’s. 

     To 84% of Norwegians the national economy is still in good shape, but positive judgments dwindle as one nears the Eurozone. Only half the Swedes and no more than 27% of Danes share Norway’s confidence in the state of their own economy. In all European countries – with the exception of Germany in part – feelings about future prospects are negative and pessimistic. Despite this basic suspicion, there is pragmatic agreement on many proposals where Scandinavia is in step with the rest of continental Europe: one thus finds moderate consensus over creating a European tax on bank profits and financial transactions, as well as stiffening the rules governing Europe-wide financial activities. 

     To sum up, the crisis of the Eurozone and fear of being sucked into it is clearly what has worsened the already Euro-diffident position of the Scandinavians. By way of evidence here, witness the clear majority of Swedes and Danes who say they want rigour and sanctions applied to over-indebted countries, but are meanwhile basically opposed to centralised fiscal policy. Launched as a tangible symbol of European integration, the Euro is inevitably tarred with failure and the fear of losing the advantages of an undeniably prosperous and competitive economic model. In the last few years the ranks of those against adopting the single currency have swelled from just over half to 65% in Denmark and 80% in Sweden. The message is crystal clear: no future for the Euro spells no future for the European Union.

Umberto Marengo
(Cambridge University)

Results of the survey may be downloaded from the link:
http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6xufjlailj/Eurozone%20Crisis%20-%20Cross-Country%20Report_06-Mar-2012_F.pdf