Serena Giusti - 23/03/2012

     The policy of isolation traditionally practised by the European Union vis-à-vis Lukashenka, the leader of Belarus, uninterruptedly since 1994, has gained momentum with the decision of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the EU, Lady Ashton and the Polish Foreign Minister, Sikorski, to recall their respective ambassadors from Minsk, followed by the withdrawal of all the ambassadors of the EU Member States concerted by the European External Service. The European Council at the beginning of March also decided to extend the list (another 21 people will be added to the previous 200) of those to whom the EU applies a restriction on freedom of movement and for whom the freezing of foreign assets is provided for.
     The tightening of the sanctions regime decided by the Council was preceded by the resolution of the European Parliament on 16 February in which the Belarus authorities were asked for a moratorium on the death penalty just passed on the alleged culprits of the Minsk underground attack in December 2010. The Belarus case brings up the question of the weak European instrumentation once more (negative conditionality by way of the so-called ‘smart sanction’) in respect to the promotion of democracy in the resilient countries or for which the membership option is excluded in the short-medium term. Belarus, ever since it was declared independent from the USSR in 1991, has never undertaken a process of transition.
     Unlike the other countries of the post-Soviet area which, with differentiated methods and schedules, started a plan for democratisation and economic liberalisation, Belarus is still a “consolidated autocracy” and keeps a planned and centralised economy. Also, in order to quell the street protests that have accompanied the officialisation of the third re-election to the office of the President of the Republic of Lukashenka (71% of the votes) in December 2010, the country’s leadership did not hesitate to implement a tough repression. In the first anniversary since the start of that repression, Ashton and the US Secretary of State Clinton made a joint statement condemning the violation of freedom and rights in the country and reconfirmed, according to the so-called ‘dual track’ approach (hitting the elite by means of sanctions and supporting civil society by means of programmes, funding, making it easier to issue visas), giving their full support to the Belarus citizens.
     In spite of a growing dissatisfaction in regard to the regime above all among the educated and urbanised people, Lukashenka nevertheless still enjoys a broad consensus among the “State” employees and the pensioners who have benefited from an increase in wages (25% before the presidential elections in 2010) and pensions, made possible by an economic system ‘subsidised’ by Moscow. The legitimacy of which Lukashenka has benefited by now has a prevalently economic nature: in 2008 the growth in GDP was around 10% while unemployment was just 1%. Belarus society has never suffered the economic and social costs of the transition and for this reason change is now feared. The Opposition in the country is divided and demoralised and hitherto has been incapable of channelling the discontent into a strategy to remove the President’s authoritarian populism.
     The EU’s weight in the complex Belarus story is scarce, while Moscow’s supply is becoming richer and at the same time essential to the survival of the regime. Indeed, Russia is its most powerful ally (the start of the customs union together with Kazakhstan, the Euro-Asian union project, economic support, joint military exercises) and as a consequence it is the only country that can lead the Belarus autocracy to collapse (increase in the prices of energy supplies, control over the distribution network, penetration in the capital of the companies in the strategic sectors, threat of an embargo on certain products, promotion of the North-South Stream system that penalises Belarus as a country of transit).
     Russia is the most important commercial partner: it absorbs 39% of exports and covers 52% of Belarus imports. The Russian leadership has been able to skilfully exploit the country’s reliance to its own advantage: by means of the talks on the gas prices Moscow has convinced Minsk to underwrite the Customs Union. In 2011 Belarus received a loan from the EurAsEC worth 3 billion dollars thanks to Russia that imposed, however, a massive privatisation and at the end of the same year, in exchange for 2.5 billion dollars, Gazprom purchased the remaining 50% of the stake in Beltransgaz. In spite of the robust Russian support, since late 2011 a serious economic crisis has been gripping Belarus. The monetary reserves have gone down by 138 million Euros and the Belarus ruble has devalued by over 50% making inflation surge to 80% with dramatic consequences for the population.
     The economic forecasts are gloomy: there will be a deceleration in economic growth down to 3.2% between 2012 and 2013. Will the economy’s downturn lead to the breakdown of the ancient “social pact” – loyalty and support in exchange for economic benefits – between Lukashenka and his fellow citizens? Who will take advantage? The EU does not seem to be equipped while Russia could shoulder the rescue. But up to what point will the Belarus people put up with the progressive loss of autonomy and until when will the EU be incapable of offering something worthwhile?

Serena Giusti
(Catholic University of Milan)